Pré-Publication, Document De Travail Année : 2025

College Admissions in France: Affirmative Action, Overlapping Reserves, and Housing Quotas

Résumé

This paper analyzes the current college admissions system in France, known as Parcoursup. The mechanism is based on the iterative version of College-Proposing Deferred Acceptance algorithm (CDA), which matches candidates -who may possess multiple traits -to regular educational institutions and boarding schools (i.e., institutions with private dormitories). First, I identify a flaw in Parcoursup that leads to instability, even when a single regular institution is considered. Subsequently, I propose two alternatives to Parcoursup. The first is a stable CDA (SCDA), constructed with stable choice rules satisfying substitutes condition for regular institutions and boarding schools. However, such choice rules exist only under the restricted model. Therefore, I also design a second alternative under the general model: a modified CDA (MCDA) that utilizes stable choice rules constructed under a social choice framework.

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Dates et versions

hal-04896232 , version 1 (19-01-2025)

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  • HAL Id : hal-04896232 , version 1

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Denis Sokolov. College Admissions in France: Affirmative Action, Overlapping Reserves, and Housing Quotas. 2025. ⟨hal-04896232⟩
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